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“Private” Means to “Public” Ends:
Governments as Market Actors
Robert C. Hockett and Saule T. Omarova*
Many people recognize that governments can play salutary roles
in relation to markets by (a) “overseeing” market behavior from
“above,” or (b) supplying foundational “rules of the game” from
“below.” It is probably no accident that these widely recognized roles
also sit comfortably with traditional conceptions of government and
market, pursuant to which people tend categorically to distinguish
between “public” and “private” spheres of activity.
There is a third form of government action that receives less attention
than forms (a) and (b), however, possibly owing in part to its straddling
the traditional public/private divide. We call it the “government as
market actor” form, whereby government instrumentalities pursue
traditionally “public” ends through traditionally “private” means.
Inattention to this pervasive form of government action might signal
a theoretical blind spot attending the public/private distinction itself.
At least as importantly, however, this inattention also denies us
a practical opportunity: it prevents our more fully exploiting the
government role in question.
*

Mr. Hockett is Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; recent Consulting Counsel,
International Monetary Fund; and recent Visiting Consultant, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Ms. Omarova is Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina College of Law; recent Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School
and Georgetown University Law Center; and past Special Advisor on Regulatory
Policy, U.S. Department of Treasury. This Article constitutes part of a larger
project on government instrumentalities as market actors, upon which the
authors expect to be working for some time. For helpful comments thus far, we
thank Adam Feibelman, Anna Gelpern, Roy Kreitner, Marc Schneiberg, Stewart
Schwab, Jay Shimshack, and other participants in the Cornell/Tel Aviv Public
and Private, Beyond Distinctions? Conference held in Ithaca on October 10-11,
2012, as well as in the Tulane conference on Responsible Regulation held in
New Orleans on March 1-3, 2013 and at the Cornell Law School faculty retreat
held in Ithaca on January 17, 2014. Views expressed and errors committed are
our own and not properly attributable to others absent their express warrant.
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This Article, part of a larger project, aims to encourage fuller
theoretical appreciation and wider practical use of the role we identify.
It first offers a provisional taxonomy of recurrent forms that the
government market actor role appears to take, affording a wealth
of illustrative case studies in so doing. It then envisions additional
good that governments might do, simply by extending their market
acting roles to spheres in which they have yet to be fully utilized.
The Article concludes by suggesting next steps in both theorizing
and employing the government market actor role.

I. Introduction: The Murky Middle

Early each weekday morning, people at a Wall Street trading desk receive

carefully drafted sets of detailed trading instructions. These prescribe purchases
and sales of specified quantities of specified securities, as well as specified
sale and repurchase (“repo”) agreements with specified counterparties. The
decisions on which the traders transact have been reached earlier the same
morning by a select group of executives, who have digested reams of financial
and market data concerning recent past and likely future market behavior.
Shortly after the sun rises over the East River, the traders will begin executing
their trades. They will be buying and selling, lending and borrowing all
morning. And they will be doing so on behalf of the United States of America.
For these traders are government agents.1
Many people seem as a matter of course to draw hard, fast distinctions
between public and private, or government and market, spheres of activity.
When governments mix with markets, on this understanding, they “intervene.”
The in-terventions then count as ex-ogenous. Governments “step in” from
“outside,” altering the otherwise natural order of things — like the hand of
God breaking in from the overhead clouds. Government is in this sense taken
for “external” to markets, while “we,” the public — for unexplained reasons
categorically distinguished from “our” government — are counted as “internal”
to the practices of market exchange. Call this the “supervisory,” or “deus ex
machina” view of government in its relation to markets.
1

No, we are not here describing a CIA “black op” or DARPA adventure —
though in some ways we could have been. This is just a generic snapshot of a
typical day’s Fed open market operations as conducted by the Trading Desk of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on Liberty Street. See infra Parts IIIVII, for more on both these and a number of other forms of actual or possible
government market operation.
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Sometimes one also encounters a “deeper” view of the relation between
government and market, pursuant to which government occupies a space more
“below” — in the “grounding” or “foundational” sense of that word — than
“above” the market. On this alternative, governments constitute markets by
formulating and/or enforcing “rules of the game” that underwrite, structure,
and even define markets “from the inside” or “ground up.” Government is
in this sense “internal” to markets, on this understanding, somewhat in the
way that genetic structure is internal to an organism or rules are internal
to games they define. It determines the shape and indeed possibility of the
market somewhat as DNA structures a life form and is prerequisite to such
forms. Call this the “constitutive,” or “foundational” view of government in
its relation to markets.
These understandings of government and market have much to recommend
them. Each metaphorically captures some critical aspect of governmental
activity in relation to markets, as well as some corresponding aspect of our
corpus of law. Much of the law we call “public,” for example, is indeed what
we call “regulatory” or “supervisory.” And much regulation is indeed less
constitutive of a market than improving of it, in the sense that the market in
question could, and in some cases in fact did, function more or less sustainably
prior to promulgation of the public regulation in question, but functions
better — often much better — when regulated. Much of the law we call
“private,” for its part, seems indeed to be foundational, even prerequisite, to
functioning markets. It is difficult to imagine market exchange taking place
at all absent some form of protectable possessory — “property” — interest,
for example. Much the same holds of promise and its legal face, contract,
at least where market exchange is to include future performance. And in the
absence of tort law or its functional normative equivalent, it is difficult to
imagine sociality itself, let alone that form of sociality which is “the market,”
persisting through time.
Whatever the utility of the supervisory and constitutive views of government
and market as metaphors for the functions of “public” and “private” law,
however, there remains at least one critically important governmental role
that both these views overlook or leave out of account — a role implicit in
the story with which we began this discussion. If we view the supervisory and
constitutive roles of government as disjoint sets that exhaust all possibilities,
then, we lay ourselves prey to a cognitive blind spot. That in turn not only
can weaken our theorizing on government and market, or public and private,
spheres of activity, but also can prevent our fully utilizing, improving, and
building upon the phenomenon in question.
We call the underappreciated governmental role that we have in mind here
the “market actor” role. In this capacity, governments act much as private
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actors do in particular markets. They employ the same means toward their
ends. They do so, however, for public rather than private ends, thereby defying,
in limited ways, such venerable but misleading dichotomies as the “public/
private” divide. They do so, moreover, with greater influence than private
parties are typically able — or permitted — to bring to bear. And we permit
our governments this form of market power, in turn, precisely because it is
public rather than private power — power wielded on behalf of and in the
name of us all.
Our aim in this Article is to draw out and illuminate this market acting role
of government. Our hope in so doing is to facilitate better and fuller use of
it.2 The present seems an auspicious moment to do this, given both (a) broad
public perception that crisis-wrought, bailout-style government stakeholding
in some large financial firms, such as occurred in the United States under
the Troubled Asset Relief (TARP) program, warrants some public say over
what these firms do, accompanied nevertheless by (b) dissatisfaction, in some
quarters, with some forms of traditional “command and control” styles of
regulating.
The Article is structured as follows. Part II provides a brief, provisional
taxonomy of governments’ market actor roles, which we disaggregate into
what we call “market-making,” “market-moving,” “market-levering,” and
“market-preserving.” Parts III-VI then elaborate each of these roles in greater
detail, providing specific examples of actual government action along each of
the specified lines. On that basis, Part VII then suggestively notes additional
spheres of activity in which government instrumentalities might take on the
market actor role to salutary effect. Part VIII concludes and looks forward.

II. Four Market-Actor Roles: A Provisional Taxonomy
There are several recurrent forms that public participation for public ends in
private markets appears to take. For purposes of this introductory Article, we
distinguish four such forms in particular, which we call “market-making,”
“market-moving,” “market-levering,” and “market-preserving.”
2

Another role played by this Article, we hope, will be to encourage further
consideration of the strengths and limitations of the traditional “public”/“private”
divide in legal and other discourses. One of us has done additional work along
these lines in other recent work. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the
Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 Brook. J. Int’l L. 665
(2010); see also Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians:
Towards Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. Corp. L. 621 (2012)
[hereinafter Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians].
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Per the first, “market-making” form, a government instrumentality bears
risks that private actors usually are unable or unwilling to bear. In so doing,
the government actor can (a) make a publicly beneficial market possible, or
(b) facilitate an incipient such market’s growth to critical mass. Per the second,
“market-moving” form, government action affects certain market prices in
certain publicly beneficial ways that we cannot ordinarily trust profit-driven
private actors to pursue. Per the third, “market-levering” form, government
action enables existing private markets to do better, or to do more of, what
they already do in more limited or otherwise suboptimal manners. Finally,
per the fourth, “market-preserving” form, government action — typically
temporary and only in extremis — prevents complete liquidation or collapse
of a normally well-functioning market whose collapse would impose negative
externalities.
The distinctions among these forms do not render them altogether mutually
excluding, nor are they hard and fast — the forms are not “Platonic.” We
shall note, for example, that market-making can serve as a means of marketlevering or market-preserving. Market-moving can do likewise, and indeed
generally any one of these roles can be employed as a means of discharging
the functions of one or more of the others in particular circumstances. But
the distinctions will prove helpful for expository purposes. They will also
afford helpful guidance when we move to envisioning additional good that
our governments can do by extending their current market actor roles into
realms where they’ve not market-acted already.
We turn now to elaborating the four forms of government market action
in more detail over the next four Parts of this Article, then to envisaging
extensions in the subsequent Part.

III. Market-Making: Priming the Counterparty Pump
Markets require willing counterparties. That trivial truth carries important and
sometimes overlooked implications for the very possibility of markets. It can
be costly, for example, to “take one’s goods to market.” Hence if some party
does not know in advance that (a) there will be people at a particular location
who (b) desire what s/he is ready to sell and (c) are able to pay for the desired
items with other goods, services, or currencies that the seller is prepared to
accept, this would-be seller might very well not “go to market.” This will be
so even if in fact there are good, willing prospective counterparties. For it is
what prospective participants actually know, rather than what is actually the
case, that is decisive here. Insofar as trading opportunities are missed in this
manner, there is “tragedy” here — even if of a decidedly quotidian sort. An
opportunity to improve multiple parties’ lots has been lost. That is a waste.
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It is in response to such waste that the market-making role emerges. The
market-maker “makes” a market in some submarket by ensuring the continuous
availability of, and thereby inducing confidence in, prospective counterparties.
S/he does this in turn by agreeing to bear two complementary risks. One is
the risk that some product does not actually sell. The market-maker assumes
this risk by agreeing to serve as something akin to a buyer of last resort. In
doing this, s/he engages in a form of what finance folk call “underwriting.”
S/he thereby affords confidence to the would-be marketer of the product in
question to go ahead and “bring it to market,” since this seller need no longer
bear the risk of non-sale.
The other risk that the market-maker assumes is the flip side of underwriter
risk. This is the risk faced by prospective buyers that there might not be
adequate supplies of the product they wish to purchase in the market. That
too is a risk that might prevent people from going to market — people who
otherwise would go to market, and whom the seller hopes come to market.
The market-maker assumes this risk by maintaining inventories of or access
to the item in question, and committing to sell units of the item to anyone
offering anything equal to or greater than a predetermined price. In assuming
this risk, the market-maker affords confidence to prospective buyers much
as s/he does to the seller in underwriting. By assuming both risks, in turn,
the market-maker averts the “tragedy” of needlessly missed opportunities for
socially beneficial exchange of goods and services noted above.
The market-maker role is perhaps most familiar in certain financial and
commodities markets, though it is not restricted to these. On stock markets,
for example, designated market-makers agree to purchase particular securities
from anyone offering them at an amount less than or equal to a stipulated
“ask” price. Symmetrically, they likewise agree to sell the securities to anyone
offering an amount greater than or equal to a stipulated “bid” price.
Given the risks assumed by would-be market-makers, it is not surprising
that they have traditionally been “big” actors endowed with substantial
resources — people like John Pierpont Morgan in his day, for example.3
3

For an illuminating popular account of the role that Morgan, in particular,
played as a sort of private provider of public goods in the financial markets,
particularly in the years prior to passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913,
see Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan (2d ed. 2010); see also Jean Strouse,
Morgan: American Financier (2000). For informative accounts of how the
Fed in the United States and the Bank of England in the United Kingdom have
recently and historically played similar roles, see, for example, Perry Mehrling,
The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort
(2010); and Gerard Hertig, Government as Investors of Last Resort: Credit
Crisis Comparative Case Studies, 13 Theoretical Inquiries L. 385 (2012).
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This is particularly so given the sense in which market-making amounts to
a canonical “public good,” inherently prone to under-provision by private
providers. Hence it is also unsurprising that the role sometimes has had to be
played by public instrumentalities. Such instrumentalities are, after all, often
(a) well resourced, (b) instituted specifically to provide public goods, and (c)
actuated by purposes other than profit-taking. Several cases in point, one of
them quite conspicuous in recent years, help to illustrate the importance of
the government as market-maker role.
The conspicuous case is the role played by the Federal Reserve and the
U.S. Treasury as “market-makers of last resort” during the worst of the 20082009 financial market collapse. The Fed played this role through a number
of facilities established specifically for the purpose, the best known of which
probably were the New York Fed’s “Maiden Lane Fund” operations. Treasury
played the role through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, better known as
“TARP,” mentioned above in the Introduction.
The objective in all of these cases was to stave-off panic-induced, selffulfillingly prophetic drops in certain asset-backed securities (ABS) prices
below what fundamentals appeared to warrant, by committing to purchase
any such assets whose prices fell beneath a certain floor level. In some cases,
a reciprocal commitment to sell the same assets to any who offered more
than a certain ceiling price “closed” the proverbial market-making “circle”
— or perhaps better put in this case, defined the proverbial spread (between
prevailing bid and ask prices). In other cases, there was less in the way of a
public commitment to making such sales than there was an intention to do so
once conditions permitted — as with TARP and Maiden Lane, for example.
In all such cases, the government entities involved ultimately turned profits
when at length they sold off, some three to four years later, the assets they had
purchased pursuant to these programs. That in turn vindicated the original
judgment that panic conditions had indeed been inducing undervaluation
of the relevant assets by private market participants. In so doing, it also
vindicated the proposition that market-making can prevent mere transitory
liquidity crises from morphing into avoidable, hence classically “tragic,”
permanent solvency crises. In this sense, the market-making role doubled
as a justifiable market-preserving role, in a manner that we elaborate more
fully below in Part VI.
It also bears noting that in all of these cases, “last resort” market-making
of a sort that only government entities could do played the classic “last
resort lending” role first articulated by Walter Bagehot in describing Bank of
England operations during the nineteenth century.4 This in turn underscored
4

See Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market
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— and continues to underscore — the fact that modern financial markets are
significantly disintermediated relative to times past — lending is much more
“securitized” than it was in Bagehot’s day. This means that governments as
market actors now can aid markets more effectively by buying and selling
debt instruments than by extending and accepting repayment of loans in the
more traditional bank-like manner of times past. That fact — that an old role
best assumes new forms when markets themselves take new forms — proves
instructive below in Part VII.
The less conspicuous cases of government market-making that bear notice
here are secondary market-making by government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs) first in home mortgage, then in higher education debt. Though few
seem aware of the fact, the securitization of home mortgage lending effectively
began not in the 1980s or 1990s, but circa 1938, with the establishment of the
first-ever large scale mortgage loan purchaser, the Federal National Mortgage
Association, better known as “Fannie Mae.” The point here was to make home
mortgage lending more attractive to banking institutions by establishing a
secondary market in home loans to which banks wishing quickly to liquidate
such assets could resort when they so chose. That would in turn lower the cost
of home mortgage credit in the primary markets, ultimately jumpstarting the
Depression-struck building industry in the short term and fostering broader
home-ownership in the long term.
As it happened, this system worked very well until the 1990s, boosting
the domestic employment-inducing construction industry and converting the
United States from a nation in which fewer than forty percent of households
owned their own homes to one in which nearly seventy percent did. Fannie
was so successful that by the 1960s it could be privatized, with the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) then established to act as competitors.5
Things came a cropper only when the vacuum opened by deregulationinduced collapse in the savings and loan industry over the course of the 1980s
attracted a new industry of unregulated “mortgage banks.” These operated
pursuant to an “originate to distribute” model of mortgage lending designed
to exploit the presence of the still mammoth and implicitly governmentguaranteed GSEs, which ultimately led to improvident lending.6 Trouble

5
6

(1873) (John Wiley & Sons 1999) (1873); see also Mehrling, supra note 3.
For a full account of this history, see Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by
Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints and Finance in an Authentic American
“Ownership Society,” 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 563 (2006).
Per the now-familiar “originate to distribute” model, mortgage lenders extended
loans to home-buyers not with a view to holding the loans in their portfolios
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might have been avoided had (a) the mortgage banks been regulated, (b) the
GSEs been kept public and accordingly less profit-oriented, or (c) the GSEs
been better regulated with a view to their loan-purchase criteria, though there
are additional complexities that should be borne in mind here.7
The home loan secondary market-making case also was sufficiently
successful, at least over its first several decades, as to have been expressly
embraced as a model for U.S. federal higher education finance policy. It is
no accident that the best known “Mae” after Fannie and Ginnie is Sallie —
the “SLM Corporation” previously known as the “Student Loan Marketing
Association,” a GSE that purchases higher education loans. It is also no
accident that, as with Fannie, the fully federal Sallie immensely increased
higher education availability from the 1960s down into the first decade of the
twenty-first century, while since privatization — in 2005 for Sallie — matters
have taken a more ominous turn.8
A final point bears noting before we turn to our next market actor role.
That is the role that government-induced standardization — a form of what we
call “market-levering” as discussed below in Part V — can play in facilitating
the market-making role. One thing that made secondary market development
possible, by both Fannie and Sallie as well as by non-government-sponsored
financial institutions, was government guaranteeing of primary market debt. In
the case of housing finance, this took the form of mortgage default insurance

7

8

and collecting monthly mortgage payments thereafter, but with a view to selling
the loans and associated payment-receipt rights to secondary investors. This
practice, which grew rapidly over the course of the 1990s, rendered mortgage
credit less expensive to home-buyers, but also rendered ultimate creditors more
vulnerable to due diligence deficits on the part of loan originators.
For a fuller account of the housing bubble story, including regulators’ and
policymakers’ multiple reasons for encouraging continued home price appreciation
against a backdrop of thirty years of middle class income stagnation, see Robert
Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1213 (2010) [hereinafter
Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance]; see also Robert Hockett, Six Years On
and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage Mess, 9 Hast. Bus. L.J.
373 (2013); Robert Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality and Market
Fragility: Some Empirics in the Political Economy of Finance, 18 N.C. Banking
Inst. J. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2204710.
See Hockett, supra note 5. For more on the somewhat “more ominous”
developments in student debt markets, see Robert Hockett & Richard Vague,
Debt, Deflation, and Debacle: Of Private Debt Writedown and Public Recovery
(2013), available at http://www.interdependence.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/
Debt-Deflation-and-Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf.
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provided by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) commencing in 1934.
In the case of higher education finance, it took the form of express government
guarantees of student loans commencing in the late 1950s. As we describe
below in Part V, these guarantees levered primary markets into secondary
markets both via the guaranteeing itself, and via the standardization that the
guaranteeing effectively wrought through the eligibility criteria on which it
conditioned its benefits.9 Here, then, is the first of a number of instances we
note in which one of the four market actor roles we identify facilitates or is
facilitated by another of them.

IV. Market-Moving: Price-Making, Not -Taking,
Pro Bono Publico
The ideal of the “free,” competitive market ordinarily excludes anything
that might go by the name of “market-moving.” At least this is so where the
moving in question would be done by private market actors. Individual market
participants are meant to lack “market power” and act as “price-takers,” not
“-makers.” This is so whether the actors in question be viewed in their buying
or selling capacities. Individuals are meant to pay “what the market requires”
and sell “what the market will bear” at “the market price.”10 (The hand that
governs the market is “invisible,” one might say, only to the extent that no
private market actor or coalition thereof can singlehandedly move it.)
The market per this ideal can be viewed as a distributively just, democratic
form of value determination. At least assuming rough equality of bargaining
power — hence of initial endowments — among participants, the price outputs of
markets in which all are price-takers can jointly constitute a “social cost” metric
derived by just, democratic means. The price of an apple in terms of oranges
under conditions of market equality will reflect both the comparative bounty
of “objective” nature in respect of apples and oranges, and the comparative
valuing of apples and oranges by “subjective” individuals whose voluntary
expenditure votes all count equally in determining relative prices.11
9 See Hockett, supra note 5.
10 For more on this ideal, see Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?,
27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Whose Ownership]; see also
Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theory of Justice,
26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Grammar of Distribution].
11 This is the ethical intuition behind so-called “Equal Division Walrasian Equilibria”
(EDWEs), as these figure into the work of some thoughtful egalitarian economists
and justice theorists. See generally Robert Hockett, Taking Distribution
Seriously (Cornell Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 08-004, 2008), available
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Actual markets of course depart from this picture — not least because
initial endowments depart so scandalously from equitable. It is nevertheless
easy to appreciate both the attraction of the picture as an ideal and the sense
in which “market-moving” capacity held by an individual or coalition might
offend it. If Mitt Soros unjustly holds half of the world’s wealth and harbors
an eccentric taste for apples, his power in the apple market will “distort,”
relative to the competitive market ideal, the price of apples for everyone else.
Mitt Soros then warps the ethically proper order of things, per the competitive
market ideal, by forcing us in effect to subsidize satisfaction of his eccentric
taste via the higher price we all pay for apples.
Things look yet worse if Mitt Soros employs his market power not simply
per accidens because he adores apples, but per intentio because he hopes to
influence prices and the profits he takes in connection with other goods or
services whose prices he can manipulate through apple market operations.12
Market-moving actions of this sort appear wrongful, again, because they offend
the democratic values from which we derive the “competitive” market ideal.
Things look quite different, however, when market-moving is done for
public, not private purposes. Indeed, market-moving might actually be publicly
undertaken to redress distributive injustice — for example, by short-selling
commodities whose quantitative easing (QE)-inflated prices disproportionately
harm the poor, as proposed below in Part VII.13 Less controversially, the
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108217; Robert Hockett
& Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited: The “Political Problem” and Its
Rawlsian Solution (Cornell Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 06-030, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931048; see also
Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 10; Hockett, Grammar of Distribution,
supra note 10.
12 An analogy can be drawn between this folksy hypothetical and an actual possibility
traced by one of us in a recent paper. The possibility in question is that some
financial institutions might trade physical commodities to bend yield curves in
commodity derivative markets in which the same institutions also hold positions.
See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2180647 (provisionally assessing this and
other possibilities raised by bank entry into the physical commodities business).
13 See infra Part VII, for more on this prospect and on quantitative easing; see also
Robert Hockett, How to Make QE More Helpful: By Fed Shorting of Commodities,
Benzinga (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1988109/howto-make-qe-more-helpful-by-fed-shorting-of-commodities. For those unfamiliar
with QE, the idea is for the central bank to augment the money supply, keep
interest rates low, and place a floor under the price of particular securities —
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market-moving might aim at producing less narrowly targeted, more widely
spread benefits.
The wages paid labor throughout an economy, for example, are an important
determinant of everyone’s macroeconomic wellbeing in virtue of their effects
upon aggregate demand. An economy faced with imminent slump might
accordingly be revived by a general increase in wages. An economy facing
imminent inflationary pressures might, symmetrically, do well to see wage
levels stabilized or lowered. A government under such circumstances might
therefore act in the name of us all by hiring large numbers of laborers in
the one case, and shedding labor or allowing attrition in the other case. The
method would work by augmenting upward wage pressures in the first case,
downward such pressures in the other. Insofar as it did, it would constitute
successful labor market-moving — in this case, moving done for a compelling
public purpose.
The claim of public purpose in cases like this would be all the more
compelling in virtue of the action’s addressing what would otherwise amount
to a classic collective action problem, the solution to which constitutes a
canonical public good. Firms render themselves less competitive than others,
for example, when they act alone to raise wages or salaries during a general
downturn. Yet the gain to aggregate demand wrought by doing so redounds not
just to the wage-raising firm, but to all. Firms acting alone are thus rationally
prone to under-provide wage rises of the sort that in aggregate boost consumer
demand and aid all — just as they are apt to engage in individually rational
but collectively self-defeating layoff-rounds during recessions.14
A collective agent, by contrast, can sidestep this collective action and
under-provision problem by moving markets economy-wide. Here as with
market-making, though, size of course matters. To move markets requires
a “big” actor; and the bigger the market in question, the bigger must be the
prospective mover. Hence it is once again unsurprising that the market-moving
role, like the market-making one, often is played by public instrumentalities. As
noted above, such instrumentalities are well resourced, instituted specifically

per QE as presently pursued, mortgage-backed securities — by committing to
purchase such securities whenever certain stipulated criteria are satisfied.
14 Bubbles, busts, and “runs,” as we presently argue, are of the same structure — a
fact that figures importantly in the prescriptions we offer below. For more on the
structure of phenomena of this sort, see Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective
Action Problems, 2 J. Fin. Persp. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239849; see also Hockett, A Fixer-Upper
for Finance, supra note 7.

Brought to you by | Cornell University Library
Authenticated | 128.253.7.19
Download Date | 7/23/14 5:52 PM

2014]

“Private” Means to “Public” Ends

65

to provide public goods such as aggregate demand increases, and actuated
by purposes other than profit-taking.
There are multiple examples of market-moving on the part of government
instrumentalities. Probably the most familiar in ordinary times, though even
this is not widely appreciated, is that of central bank open market operations
(OMO) of the kind with which we introduced this Article, i.e., in which the
central bank or monetary authority purchases or sells treasury securities.
The idea in this case is to influence financial institutions’ money-holdings
and, with them, the supply of credit-money in the broader economy — this
in turn to stabilize consumer goods- and services-pricing and employment
levels economy-wide.
A somewhat more familiar case in the present era amounts to a variation
on garden variety OMO. This is the case of QE, pursuant to which central
banks deal in securities additional to Treasuries in hopes of (a) influencing
credit conditions more forcefully, (b) shoring-up particularly vulnerable or
important asset classes, or (c) both. As the foregoing in general and (b) in
particular suggests, market-moving can overlap, operationally speaking, with
market-making, in that the government actor commits to buying or selling as
a means of influencing market behavior in both cases. And this in turn means
that it also can overlap with market-preserving, in virtue of market-making’s
own overlap with the same as noted above in Part III and elaborated further
below in Part VI.

V. Market-Levering: Optimizing Preexisting
Infrastructures
Sometimes a particular market exists in an underdeveloped or incipient form,
but remains less extensive than we might wish. In other cases the market in
question might be quite well developed, but nevertheless capable of doing
more public good than it already does if augmented, altered, commandeered
or absorbed in particular ways for particular purposes. Finally, in yet other
cases, there might be public goods that are not associated with particular
institutions or markets as they are currently constituted, but that can be had
through some subtle alteration made to those institutions or markets. In such
cases, governments as market actors might act within these or neighboring
markets to bring on the salutary effects in question.
It might, for example, be possible to obtain more or less affordable and
reliable banking services, or (somewhat less) affordable and dependable
deposit, flood, or loan default insurance, from private markets at a given stage
of history. That will in turn allow for greater liquidity, activity, and consequent
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growth in particular sectors, ultimately improving the lot of us all. It might
nevertheless be the case that the benefits in question could be enjoyed on
a much larger scale, or at much lower expense, or both, if there were but
some form of secondary market or higher-order risk-pooling arrangement
augmenting the primary market. The augmenting market or arrangement in
question, however, might lie beyond the scope of private parties’ capacities
to provide at a given stage of economic development. Or it might, for some
time at least, be widely believed to lie beyond those capacities. In such case
public provision or facilitation of the arrangement in question might “lever”
the primary market into something more beneficial than it can otherwise be.
American economic history seems to be rich with examples of this
phenomenon. Home mortgage and student loan insurance, for example,
appear to have been thought too costly or even impossible to provide by
private parties. Then government instrumentalities, with their greater riskbearing capacities, began providing such services directly in the late 1930s
and late 1950s, respectively, in the form of Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) mortgage default insurance and government-guaranteed student loans
(GSLs).15 Once they did so, risk was reduced in the primary markets, which
lowered borrowing costs in the same and accordingly brought rapid growth.
In some of these cases the market-levering role resembles the marketmaking role in its risk-resolving, public good-providing, capital-expanding
characteristics. In other such cases, the levering role works a bit differently
— as, for example, when government plays a standard-setting or related
coordination problem-solving role by favoring a particular standard in its
own influential market acting. In all of these cases, government “levers”
preexisting private infrastructures in manners that render public goods more
forthcoming at lower cost than is otherwise possible.
The move from coal to petroleum as favored energy source early in the
twentieth century, for example, and from two-year to thirty-year mortgages
as standard mortgage forms during the New Deal era, appear to constitute
particularly fateful cases in point. The U.S. military set the standard in the
first case, the new FHA established in 1934 in the other. The federal GSL
program begun in the 1960s and renamed the “Stafford Loan” program in the
1990s played a similar role in setting student loan standards. In these latter
two cases, in turn, standard-setting also facilitated the development of the
ultimately credit cost-reducing secondary markets noted earlier.16
There are many other examples of market-levering in the sense that
we have in mind here. Government procurement and related policies are
15 See Hockett, supra note 5.
16 Id.
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particularly conspicuous cases in point. The Medicare, Medicaid, and Social
Security programs can significantly influence the standard forms that health
insurance policies take over time. Public pensions can and sometimes do,
through their investing and contracting practices, similarly influence the
investment and insurance practices of other firms. Military and other public
contracting practices, as already suggested, likewise significantly influence
common practices and prevailing standards throughout the broader economy
— including standards that govern the contractual treatment of members of
minority groups. So do, of course, the criteria employed by central banks like
the U.S. Fed in determining what forms of private credit-extension by private
banking institutions to monetize through discounting.
We hasten to note that none of this is to say that the various forms of levering
in question need remain efficient indefinitely. There might, for example,
have been compelling infrastructural reasons for the United States to employ
market-levering in relation to preexisting markets for health insurance, home
lending and higher education lending when national action along these lines
was in its infancy. By now, however, continued private involvement in these
sectors seems at best a regrettably costly compromise with reactionary forces
at large in the polity — forces who demand that government actions socialize
only risk while providing bonanzas to sectional interests.17
“Medicare for all,” renationalized GSEs, and direct rather than merely
federally guaranteed student loans, for example, would seem much more
efficient than what we are living with now.18 But because the mixed publicprivate regime we are living with now enables lending institutions to charge
higher rates to borrowers while nevertheless transferring default risk to the
public, such institutions demand that we keep what we have. Much the same
17 The home and higher education lending cases also presents a curious twist in
this instance. As noted above, here the systems operated well when government,
through the GSEs, was the sole secondary market provider. Things came a
cropper precisely when private securitizers got into the act. It might be well
going forward for government to do all the primary and secondary lending where
home and higher education loans are concerned, given their comprehensive
social policy significance since the early days of the republic. For more on the
latter, see sources cited in supra notes 5, 11.
18 For more on why, see, for example, Robert Hockett, Making (Some) Sense of
the Health Care Reform Debate: Social Science, Social Insurance, Social-‘ism,’
and So-On, 53 Challenge 28 (2010). The problem in essence is that private
providers, even when given public guarantees of or subsidies for the loans
or insurance they extend, still require profits, and in so doing privatize gains
while governments socialize losses. Direct government provision eliminates the
asymmetry.
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might ultimately come to be said of many forms of credit-extension, including
that to small business in particular.

VI. Market-Preserving (Backstopping): Rendering
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies Less Prophetic
There are occasions, particularly in the realm of finance, during which markets
can disappear altogether in response to “runs” on or “fire sales” of particular
assets when asset price bubbles reach outer limits. Absent some breathing
room offered by temporary liquidity-provision in these periods, liquidity crises
can morph into full-on solvency crises. That in turn can result in long-term
credit contractions of protracted duration, the radial macroeconomic effects
of which can destroy hard-won wealth and indeed lives, as events in the U.S.
circa 2008-2009 have quite recently dramatized.
The reason that temporary liquidity-provision, or “breathing room,” as
we’ve called it, can help to forestall movement from liquidity crisis to solvency
crisis stems from financial panics’ status as what one of us has elsewhere
called “recursive collective action problems.”19 As implicitly suggested
above, a collective action problem is a situation in which multiple individually
rational decisions aggregate into collectively self-defeating outcomes. The
problem is recursive when it bears “feedback” properties, such that movement
in a particular direction tends itself to induce further movement in the same
direction, ending at no satisfactory equilibrium.
Asset price bubbles and busts are recursive collective action problems in
this sense. When credit is abundant and borrowing costs correspondingly low,
it can be individually rational to borrow in order to buy assets whose prices
are rising. The spread between borrowing costs and capital gains appreciation
rates is precisely what renders levered speculative asset purchases financially
rational for each individual. Everyone’s acting thus rationally, however, drives
prices yet higher, inducing more borrowing, more buying, more price rises and
so on, ultimately carrying leverage to perilous levels. The process continues
until credit runs dry. Thereupon panic ensues and the process moves into
reverse, the ensuing collective calamity being the product, paradoxically, of
multiple individually rational actions just as the buildup was.20
19 For more on this phenomenon, see Hockett, supra note 13; and Hockett, supra
note 14.
20 See Hockett, supra note 13; Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note
7; see also Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, 37 Cornell L.F. 14
(2011); Robert Hockett, Bail-Outs, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 Challenge 39
(2009) [hereinafter Hockett, Bail-Outs, Buy-Ins].
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Enter here the need of temporary liquidity-provision or “breathing room.”
Busts constitute “undershooting” just as booms constitute “overshooting” of
“fundamental” — that is, longer-term sustainable — asset value. If undershooting
can somehow be arrested in its tracks during a panic or “run” until heads
cool, then, value can be salvaged, harm can be minimized, and credit can
be expected to flow again sooner. The problem is that no individual market
participant typically can afford to wait to find out whether s/he is verging
on undershooting. S/he must sell before others’ sales drive her assets’ values
yet lower.
Enter here the market-preserving or “-backstopping” role, in this case
a specific variation on the market-making role. If some agent can act as a
lender or purchaser of last resort — and, as importantly, can credibly commit
to prospective sellers that it will indeed act in this manner notwithstanding
prevailing market sentiment — that agent can slow down the run and thereby
minimize collective undershooting. In so doing it will be acting as a collective
agent, solving a particularly poignant — because recursive, hence all the more
destructive — collective action problem.
The agent in question might also solve a distinct but related collective
action problem in some such cases. During a panic it often is tempting for
individual actors to assume that they hold disproportionate shares of “toxic”
assets — even when the total market share of such assets is quite small and
known to be such.21 In these cases the market portfolio will be effectively
undervalued, because each party will assume that s/he holds more toxic assets
than s/he does, with all parties accordingly overestimating market toxicity in
aggregate.22 That overestimation is what underwrites so-called “credit crunch”
and “liquidity hoarding.”23

21 One of us, in the sources cited in supra note 20, refers to this as a “reverse Lake
Woebegone” problem: all the holders hold portfolios that, by their own lights
at any rate, are “below average.”
22 Assume that ten percent of the assets in a market are toxic and all investors
know this. Some investors hold less than ten percent toxic assets, others more,
but on average it all washes out to ten percent — and again, all investors know
this. Now if everyone nevertheless (mistakenly) believes s/he in particular holds
twenty percent toxic assets, with others putatively holding smaller percentages of
such assets, then the market as a whole will be undervalued by its participants.
It will be treated and valued, in effect, as a market in which twenty percent, not
ten percent, of assets are toxic. See sources cited in supra notes 19-20.
23 See, e.g., John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Credit, Interest, and
Money ch. 12 (1936) (describing the psychology of manic buying and panic
selling in asset markets afflicted by Knightian uncertainty).
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When this happens, the aggregate undervaluation is attributable decisively
to the fragmented ownership of the market portfolio. Absent the fragmentation,
the aggregate undervaluation would not occur. One way to restore accurate
valuation of the market portfolio, then, is (at least temporarily) to concentrate
ownership. That way the (single) holder and controller of the market portfolio
can rest assured that “his” or “her” portfolio is not more toxic than it actually
is.24 To play this role, however, again requires considerable resources, as
well as trust on the part of the principals for whom the agent purports to be
acting. As with the market-making and market-moving roles, then, so here a
government agent is best situated to play the critical role of collective agent.
For, once again, such instrumentalities are generally (a) well resourced, (b)
instituted specifically to provide public goods of the sort that solutions to
collective action problems constitute, and (c) actuated by purposes other
than private profit-taking.
We have already noted, in effect, some examples of this market-preserving
role in action above. Both TARP and the Federal Reserve’s ABS market-making
operations in 2008-2009, as we observed earlier, were cases in point. But
there are others, not all of them operating through market-making of the kind
elaborated in Part III. Fannie Mae, for example, with some help from FHA and
the other mortgage finance GSEs, is presently the sole secondary purchaser
of (qualifying) new home mortgage loans. The virtual disappearance of the
private secondary market since our most recent crisis means that Fannie is the
primary underwriter of the continued existence of the primary mortgage market
itself. Another, partial example is the latest rendition of Fed QE policy — the
so-called “QE3” plans announced in the autumn of 2012. Here we have a case
of more Fed market-moving of the Part IV variety, to be conducted with a
view partly to (a) providing further stimulus to macroeconomic growth and
employment, per the traditional market-moving role, but also to (b) assisting
the GSEs in their mortgage-market preservation effort. A third example, less
reminiscent of market-making and market-moving, is the role played by the
U.S. government in preserving the U.S. automobile manufacturing sector
during 2008-2009. By extending temporary credit and thereby affording time
for necessary restructuring when no private actor was able to do so, the federal
government preserved, from the supply side, the market for domestically
manufactured automobiles.

24 It was on this ground that one of us, with others, urged that the federal government
temporarily purchase and hold MBS in 2008 during the lead-up to crisis, until
veritably toxic assets could be sorted out from sound ones. See, e.g., Hockett,
Bail-Outs, Buy-Ins, supra note 20.
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A final point worth noting here for purposes of Part VII immediately below
is that, in light of the foregoing, “macroprudential” financial regulation of the
kind elaborated below can be viewed as a symmetrical complement to the
“market-preserving” role we have just singled out for attention. “Leaning,”
in other words, is of the same form as “cleaning.”25
The reason is that macroprudential regulation is in principal measure a
matter of bubble-preemption,26 and bubble-preemption is structurally identical
to liquidity-provision of the sort just countenanced, only operating in reverse.
The aim in both cases is for a collective agent to minimize over- or undershooting by disaggregated market actors whose collectively over- or undershooting behavior is individually rational. In its essence, the collective agent’s
means of doing this in both cases is through credit-modulation. During a bust
the agent supplies credit which is too rapidly contracting. During a boom the
same agent — as macroprudential regulator — mops up credit which is too
rapidly expanding.
To grasp this a bit more intuitively and appreciate its potential relation
to the government as market actor role, recall again the story with which
we opened this Article. There we were simply describing Fed open market
operations (OMO), conducted from the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Now, as noted in Part III above, these are market-moving
operations meant to determine lending rates. That is done, in turn, principally
to maintain “price stability,” as this term came (needlessly narrowly) to be
interpreted by American regulators from the 1980s until recently. The aim is
to keep consumer goods and services prices from rising or falling inordinately.
A good macroprudential regulator and crisis liquidity-provider, it now should

25 The allusion here is to a tired debate, primarily between American “cleaners”
and Basel “leaners,” over whether bubbles can be anticipated and preempted, or
whether instead the sole role of a central bank is to “clean up” by mass lending
after a crash. See, e.g., Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 7;
Robert C. Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional “Safety and
Soundness” to Systemic “Financial Stability” in Financial Supervision, 8 Va.
L. & Bus. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206189; see also Robert Hockett, Leaning, Cleaning,
and Macroprudence, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Mar.
27, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/27/leaning-cleaningand-macroprudence/; Robert Hockett, Practical Guidance on Macroprudential
Finance-Regulatory Reform, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg.
(Nov. 22, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/22/practicalguidance-on-macroprudential-finance-regulatory-reform/.
26 See sources cited in supra note 25.
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be emphasized, is doing the same thing in respect of financial asset prices.
(A bubble is a hyperinflation, a bust a hyperdeflation.)
That more authorities on financial regulation in recent decades have not
appreciated this kinship is something of a mystery. Prior regulators — the
likes of Fed Chairmen William McChesney Martin and Paul A. Volcker —
seem to have understood it quite well. Had the Greenspan Fed seen things
likewise, we might have fared better by 2008, though this is not certain.27 In
any event, as we suggest in Part VII below, central banks might, then, employ
their market actor roles in the cause of macroprudential regulation itself. That
is a use of the role whose possibilities do not seem as yet to have been fully
appreciated, notwithstanding its structural identity with the familiar “lender
of last resort” role just explicated under the aspect of market-preservation.

VII. Extensions: Some Suggestive Examples
We turn now to envisaging a number of extensions of the government actor
role into spheres in which it does not appear yet to have been utilized. Our aim
here is to be suggestive and illustrative rather than exhaustive. We also limit
ourselves to straightforward, incremental extensions from market activities
that are already undertaken. In later work we shall be more ambitious.
Several quite simple examples, then, are actions that might be taken by
central banks along lines that are already more or less familiar in light of
the discussion above. As suggested in passing in Part IV on market-moving,
for instance, the U.S. Fed could fine-tune its QE policies, rendering them
less harmful to lower income Americans, by short-selling commodities, the
prices of which QE as presently conducted tends to inflate.28 This would be a
straightforward extension of the market-moving role already played by the Fed.

27 Not that there is any guarantee here, in light of the constraints imposed both (a)
by the dollar’s role globally and (b) the strains that income and wealth inequality
place upon financial stability. See Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: An Essay
in Constructive Retrieval, 16 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 401 (2013); Hockett
& Dillon, supra note 7; Daniel Alpert, Robert Hockett & Nouriel Roubini, The
Way Forward: Moving Past the Post-Bubble, Post-Bust Economy to Renewed
Growth and Competitiveness (The New Am. Found., Cornell Legal Studies,
Research Paper No. 12-01, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987139.
28 See Hockett, supra note 13, and accompanying text.
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So would, were the Fed to adopt it, express employment rate targeting as
an analog to the inflation targeting advocated by many central bank observers.29
Here the idea would be both to seek, and to announce the intention to seek,
an employment rate within some stipulated range, then to employ OMO
specifically to maintain employment within that range. A variation on this
form of monetary policy, more on the fiscal than traditional monetary side
of government operations, would be direct, countercyclical government
employment and attrition activity of the sort countenanced above in Part III.
Finally and yet more generally here, as noted above in Part IV, the Fed, along
with other nations’ central banks or counterpart macroprudential regulators,
could readily employ OMO in sundry financial asset markets as a means of
securing price stability in these markets akin to the price stability it already
seeks in consumer goods and services markets. This it could readily do both
by (a) going long certain undervalued assets as it already has done and still
does in its market-preserving role vis-à-vis certain ABS, and (b) going short
certain overvalued assets such as many residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) assuredly were during the housing price bubble years.30
Of course, certain exponents of asset markets’ informational efficiency
will doubt Fed capacity to outguess the markets in hopes of pricking bubbles.
But as noted above in Part VI and works cited therein, these people have lost
the old “lean versus clean” debate, which on the merits they never actually
“won.”31 The fact is that asset-overvaluation is little if any more difficult to
detect and to measure than is consumer price inflation, and the same kinds
of operation — viz., open market operation — as we employ to trim back the
latter can be employed to trim back the former.32
Other examples of possible further governmental use of private means
for public ends move beyond central banks and monetary authorities. One
such example would be that of public-private loan refinance partnerships
to unclog mortgage loan markets through use of public eminent domain
authority, as advocated by one of us elsewhere.33 Here, federal, state, and/
29 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke et al., Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the
International Experience (2001).
30 For more on such prospects and their need, see sources cited in supra note 25.
31 See sources cited in supra note 25.
32 See sources cited in supra note 25.
33 See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 121 (2012); Robert
Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for
Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 Current Issues Econ. & Fin. 1 (2013); see also
Saule T. Omarova, An Unexpected Remedy: Eminent Domain as a Potential
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or local government instrumentalities, partly financed by current RMBS
holders, would effectively “make” residential mortgage refinance markets
via compulsory purchases of underwater mortgage loans currently locked in
private label securitization (PLS) trusts by dysfunctional pooling and servicing
agreements (PSAs) — agreements that, in thus locking up loans, block even
mutually beneficial transactions, hence markets.34
In thus acting, these public-private partnerships would be addressing a
classic market failure induced by contract rigidities that continue to impose
avoidable deadweight loss upon bondholders, homeowners, neighborhoods,
and the broader economy alike. They would also be acting, in effect, to restore
markets and mortgage credit flows — variations on the market-preserving and
-levering roles, respectively. Finally, the criteria employed in selecting PLS
loans for compulsory purchase might even be viewed, in effect, as “inverse”
industry standards, in the sense that targeted loans are precisely those that
should never have been extended under the conditions that they were during
the bubble years. This would make for a particularly interesting, not to say
ironical, twist on the standard-setting form of the market-levering role.35
Another potential extension of the governmental market actor role would be
the case of public-private infrastructure banks. Banks of this sort are initially
capitalized by a limited government appropriation, then supplemented by
private subscriptions. Returns on completed projects then go in part toward
compensating the private investors. The market-levering role of such banks is
obvious: private capital markets are levered to finance public goods-yielding
projects that currently are not privately financeable, yielding more privately
financed “bang” for the publicly invested “buck.” The flipside of this marketlevering function is a variation on the market-making function: private investors
in search of reliable “yield” beyond that afforded by effectively near-zero
yield Treasury securities now have an outlet.36
A final example of governmental market action thus far untried — at least
in the United States — brings us full circle, to an observation with which we
introduced this Article. There we noted that many Americans think the direct
stakeholder role taken by the U.S. Treasury in certain financial firms that
Solution to the Mortgage Crisis, Jotwell (Dec. 12, 2012), http://corp. jotwell.
com/an-unexpected-remedy-eminent-domain-as-a-potential-solution-to-themortgage-crisis/.
34 See sources cited in supra note 33.
35 See sources cited in supra note 33.
36 See, e.g., Robert Hockett & Robert Frank, Public Infrastructure Investment,
Renewed Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position (Cornell Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 2-04, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1987656.
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it rescued in 2008-2009 through capital infusions ought to have warranted
some say in the governance of those firms. This intuition can be generalized.
One possible result would be a variation on the “golden shares” idea familiar
in some non-U.S. jurisdictions, pursuant to which governments take partial
ownership stakes in firms in order to exercise “voice” in the deliberations
that ultimately issue in firms’ decisions.37
“Voice” in this sense can be viewed as a form of influence standing a bit
short of “command” or “control.” Recognition that private suppliers of equity
capital ought not in all circumstances be the sole exercisers of voice is not
altogether unheard of. It underlies, for example, the system of “codetermination”
that operates among certain classes of German firm, pursuant to which labor
is represented on corporate boards just as is capital. But codetermination
need not be limited to labor alone as sole co-determiner with capital. The
public at large might well play the role too, ensuring that public interests are
considered in corporate deliberations even when not categorically imposed via
traditional regulation. In return, of course, firms would receive partly public
capitalization — rendering the public at large an additional capital supplier
rather as individuals are now.
These are just some of many possible avenues for extension of the government
as market actor role. Consider, for example, the role public health insurers can
play in providing competition in health insurance markets otherwise cursed
with “natural monopoly” properties — a role that some extolled in connection
with the so-called “public option” that nearly made its way into the U.S.
Affordable Care Act of 2010.38 Or consider the similar role — in addition to
other salutary roles — that “public banks” like the German Sparkassen or
the recently celebrated Bank of North Dakota can play in local and regional
banking markets by lending directly to students and small businesses whose
successes yield widely spread positive externalities.39
Or, finally for now, consider the public good that some “state-owned
enterprises,” public pensions, and sovereign wealth funds might do — and in
37 An analog to this role has recently been envisaged by one of us for regulatory
bodies themselves. See Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians, supra
note 2.
38 See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 18.
39 See, e.g., Yolanda Kodrzycki & Tal Elmatad, The Bank of North Dakota: A
Model for Massachusetts and Other States? (2011), available at http://www.
bos.frb.org/economic/neppc/researchreports/2011/neppcrr1102.pdf; see also
Bank of North Dakota (Prairie Public Television, 2005), available at http://www.
prairiepublic.org/television/prairie-public-on-demand/bank-of-north-dakota;
Public Banking Conference, P ublic B anking in A merica , http://www.
publicbankinginamerica.org/conference-2013 (last visited May 29, 2013).
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some cases might already be doing — by way of publicly beneficial marketmoving and market-levering. And consider how these might be likewise
employed for publicly beneficial market-making and market-preserving
purposes. The more one thinks along these lines, the wider the roads ahead
seem to look.

Conclusion: The Road(s) Ahead
We have covered a good bit of ground here in at least cursory and suggestive
fashion. Much more, however, both remains to be done and, we believe, ought
to be done. Contemporary economic and political life is just too complex
and too nuanced to lend itself readily to crude public/private distinctions, or
to permit leaving broad regulatory avenues out of account and unexplored.
As we noted in introducing this Article, the public/private divide captures
some things, but misses others. It is quite flummoxed, for example, by the
operations of state-communist hedge funds in private global capital markets.40
The fact that theories suffused by this distinction are rendered speechless in
the face of such fateful phenomena suggests that we need much more, much
better, more nuanced theorizing.
Traditional “command and control” regulation, for its part, whether in
“smart” or in “dumb” varieties, can do immeasurable good.41 But so can
market-making, market-moving, market-levering and market-preserving
of the kinds we’ve elaborated. These are all roles per which government
instrumentalities act on markets by acting in them. They are roles, in other
words, per which public actors do public good by acting rather as private
actors do — save with publicly warranted market power.
We believe that the surface of these roles’ potential, much like their
theoretic significance, has thus far been barely scratched. Hence we hope
that this Article, as well as the larger project of which it is part, might help to
jumpstart a very “big” research agenda with big public payoff. Government
instrumentalities already are groping along these lines in quite salutary ways.
More careful attention paid the phenomenon, and attendant theorization,
“creative visualization,” and experimentation, should lever these developments
up to their fuller potentials.
40 See, e.g., Donald Straszsheim, China Buys Wall Street, Forbes, Dec. 27,
2007, http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/26/straszheim-china-cic-oped-cx_
dhs_1227straszheim.html.
41 One of us explores the virtues of simplicity — “dumbness” — in various components
of the finance-regulatory regime in a new working paper. See Saule T. Omarova,
Dumb Regulation for Boring Banks: A Smart Cure for Systemic Fragility?
(Working Paper, 2013) (on file with authors).
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